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ARTICLE
PERSONAL LIABILITY TORT LITIGATION
AGAINST FEDERAL EMPLOYEES –
A PRIMER
PAUL MICHAEL BROWN1
Every year, plaintiffs name thousands of current or former federal em-
ployees as defendants in civil suits, asserting claims against them in their
individual capacity and seeking to recover money damages from their per-
sonal assets. Usually these claims sound in tort, and Department of Justice
attorneys defend them.
I. BASICS OF INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY REPRESENTATION
It has long been the position of the Department of Justice that personal
liability tort claims against federal employees implicate the interests of the
United States. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 517 authorizes Department of Jus-
tice attorneys to defend these claims in accordance with guidelines found in
28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15, 50.16.2
The guidelines cover current or former federal employees who have
been “sued, subpoenaed, or charged in their individual capacities,” but the
guidelines do not define those terms. In some cases, plaintiffs draft their
complaints so poorly it is difficult to ascertain if a personal liability claim
has been asserted. Department of Justice attorneys generally look for three
things. First, is the employee named in the caption as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)? Second, is there an allegation the employee
acted wrongfully? Third, does the prayer for relief seek money damages? If
all three of these things are in the complaint, it is usually safe to conclude
there is a personal liability claim and to counsel the employee to request
individual capacity representation.
1. Senior Counsel, Constitutional Torts Staff, Torts Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Washington, D.C. Paul Michael Brown graduated from the University of Georgia
Law School with honors in 1988 and began his Department career that same year via the Attorney
General’s Honors Program. In 2009, the Attorney General presented him with the John Marshall
Award for Outstanding Legal Achievement in Providing Legal Advice.
2. See also U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 4-5.412 (2007).
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Individual capacity representation by a Department of Justice attorney
is not mandatory. A federal employee may retain counsel at his own ex-
pense. But this is rare. Most employees prefer representation by a Depart-
ment of Justice attorney because there is no cost to them. The guidelines
require employees seeking individual capacity representation to make a re-
quest through their employing agency.3 Unless the request is “clearly un-
warranted,” the agency must forward it to the appropriate litigating division
along with the court papers served and an “agency statement.”4
Usually, requests for individual capacity representation go to the Civil
Division. But the Tax Division often handles requests from employees of
the Internal Revenue Service in suits arising out of efforts to collect income
taxes. Within the Civil Division, the Constitutional Torts Staff in the Torts
Branch handles the overwhelming majority of requests. Requests in suits
challenging the adequacy of medical care for incarcerated persons, how-
ever, go to the Federal Tort Claims Act Staff in the Torts Branch.
The guidelines set forth a two-part test for individual capacity repre-
sentation. First, the conduct giving rise to the claim must have occurred
within the scope of federal employment. Second, it must be in the interest
of the United States to assign a Department of Justice attorney to defend the
individual.5 The litigating division reviews the complaint, the agency state-
ment, and any supporting documentation to determine if these two condi-
tions are met. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this review is routine,
and the litigating division approves the employee’s request as a matter of
course.
In difficult or novel cases, however, and in cases where initial review
suggests the request should be denied, the matter is elevated for review by
more senior officials. In the Civil Division, this means the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General who oversees the Torts Branch. The Deputy Assistant
Attorney General may, at her option, convene the Civil Division Represen-
tation Committee to provide her with additional analysis and guidance.
If individual capacity representation is approved, the Department of
Justice attorney assigned to defend the employee enters into a “full and
traditional attorney-client relationship,” and all communication between the
employee and the Department of Justice attorney is privileged.6 Accord-
ingly, special measures are taken to ensure that privileged material is
clearly identified and segregated in the case file. Agency counsel employed
by any Department of Justice component (such as attorneys employed by
components like the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug Enforce-
3. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(1) (2011).
4. Id.
5. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(2); U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 2, § 4-5.412(B).
6. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3).
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ment Administration) are bound by the privilege as well7 and must take the
same precautions.
In contrast, counsel employed by other agencies have the option of
being bound by the privilege or not. Department of Justice attorneys repre-
senting employees of agencies other than the Department of Justice will
ascertain early in the litigation if agency counsel agree to be bound by the
privilege and carefully memorialize this in the case file. If agency counsel
opts out of the privilege, Department of Justice attorneys will take care to
avoid any communications with agency counsel that might waive the
privilege.
The guidelines on individual capacity representation include a number
of terms and conditions.8 These terms and conditions are set forth in the
DOJ-399 form, which is available from the Constitutional Torts Staff. De-
partment of Justice attorneys representing current or former federal employ-
ees in their individual capacities will ensure the client executes this form
and that it is made part of the case file.
Some federal employees have purchased professional liability insur-
ance. As of this writing, there are three companies selling this coverage:
Federal Employees Defense Services, Mass Benefits Consultants, and
Wright USA (formerly Wright & Company). Any federal employee who
serves as a “law enforcement officer,” a “supervisor or management offi-
cial,” or “a temporary fire line manager” is eligible for reimbursement “not
to exceed one-half” of the premium paid for this type of insurance.9 Depart-
ment of Justice attorneys are eligible for reimbursement as well.10 Depart-
ment counsel assigned to represent federal employees in their individual
capacities will inquire at the outset whether the client carries professional
liability insurance. If so, the carrier should be promptly notified of the
pending suit and kept informed as the litigation progresses.
II. TYPES OF PERSONAL LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES SOUNDING IN TORT
There are three types of personal liability claims sounding in tort
against federal employees in their individual capacities: (1) personal liabil-
ity claims premised upon an alleged violation of the Constitution;11 (2) per-
sonal liability claims premised upon a violation of a federal statute;12 and
7. Id.
8. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(8)–(12).
9. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, § 406, 114
Stat. 2831, 2850 (2000).
10. Justice Mgmt. Div., Financial Management Policies & Procedures, Bull. No. 05-17
(2005).
11. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1999) (Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
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(3) personal liability claims premised upon a violation of state tort law.13
This article will discuss the most common defense strategies for each type
of claim.14
III. COMMON ISSUES THAT ARISE WHEN DEFENDING FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES AGAINST PERSONAL LIABILITY
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CLAIMS
A. Whether a Bivens remedy should be inferred at all
In Bivens, the Supreme Court allowed the district courts to infer a per-
sonal liability remedy for money damages against federal employees di-
rectly under the Constitution.15 While many lawyers describe all types of
personal liability claims as “Bivens claims,” this is not correct. To be pre-
cise, a Bivens claim is a tort claim against a federal actor in his individual
capacity seeking money damages from his personal assets and challenging
conduct that allegedly violates a right secured by the Constitution.
Unlike constitutional torts claims allowed by statute (such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), the Bivens remedy is judicially created. So the Supreme Court
early on cautioned that where “special factors counsel hesitation,” it may
not be appropriate to infer a Bivens remedy.16 The Court subsequently ex-
plained that a Bivens remedy does not lie in two situations: (1) where Con-
gress has provided an equally effective alternative remedy and declared it to
be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution, and (2) where, in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel
hesitation.17
Later Supreme Court decisions show a great reticence to infer the Biv-
ens remedy. In 1983, the Court declined to infer a Bivens remedy for a
federal employee seeking to litigate a constitutional claim arising in the
context of his employment because the comprehensive remedial scheme es-
tablished by the Civil Service Reform Act constituted a special factor.18 In
1988, the Court declined to infer a Bivens remedy for a plaintiff trying to
litigate a Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim after being denied
Social Security payments because the Social Security Act’s review process
was a special factor.19 In 2001, the Court declined to infer a Bivens remedy
for an inmate seeking to assert an Eighth Amendment claim against a pri-
13. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 163 (1991) (medical malpractice).
14. For additional coverage of this topic, we invite your attention to Mary Hampton Mason,
You Mean I Can Be Sued? An Overview of Defending Federal Employees in Individual Capacity
Civil Suits, U.S. ATTY’S BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), July 2002, at 1, 1–5.
15. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
16. Id. at 395–96.
17. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980).
18. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
19. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
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vate prison contractor because the inmate had an alternative remedy in the
form of a respondeat superior negligence claim against the corporation.20
In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence, we have extended its holding
only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitution-
ally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any
alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s
unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not pre-
sent, we have consistently rejected invitations to extend
Bivens . . . .21
In 2007, the Court stressed that a Bivens remedy for a claimed consti-
tutional violation “has to represent a judgment about the best way to imple-
ment a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter
what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest.”22
The courts of appeal have been similarly disinclined to infer a Bivens
remedy. In Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to
infer a Bivens remedy for an alien seeking to assert a constitutional tort
claim against the Attorney General and other high-ranking executive branch
employees, arising out of his extraordinary rendition from the United States
to a foreign country.23 The decision notes Arar’s effort to hold the Bivens
defendants personally liable for his rendition implicated complex questions
touching upon national security, foreign policy, the protection of classified
information pertaining to diplomatic relations, and the details of operational
intelligence matters.24 The court concluded these and other factors were
such that it should decline Arar’s invitation to infer a Bivens remedy,
reasoning:
Any analysis of these questions would necessarily involve us in
an inquiry into the work of foreign governments and several fed-
eral agencies, the nature of certain classified information, and the
extent of secret diplomatic relationships. An investigation into the
existence and content of such assurances would potentially em-
barrass our government through inadvertent or deliberate disclo-
sure of information harmful to our own and other states. Given
the general allocation of authority over foreign relations to the
political branches and the decidedly limited experience and
knowledge of the federal judiciary regarding such matters, such
an investigation would also implicate grave concerns about the
separation of powers and our institutional competence.25
20. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
21. Id. at 70.
22. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (emphasis supplied).
23. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
24. Id. at 574–78.
25. Id. at 578 (citation omitted).
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In Wilson v. Libby, the D.C. Circuit considered a personal liability con-
stitutional tort claim brought by a Central Intelligence Agency employee
and her husband against the Vice President and other senior administration
officials, who allegedly improperly disclosed the employee’s covert status
in retaliation for her husband’s protected First Amendment activity.26 The
D.C. Circuit declined to infer a Bivens remedy because the Privacy Act
afforded plaintiffs an alternative remedy where the challenged conduct in-
volved wrongful dissemination of private information from government
records.27
In Benzman v. Whitman, the Second Circuit decided a case in which
residents of Manhattan sought to assert a Fifth Amendment substantive due
process claim against the head of the Environmental Protection Agency for
allegedly misrepresenting the dangers posed by airborne contaminants fol-
lowing the September 11 terrorist attacks.28 The Second Circuit declined to
infer a Bivens remedy because plaintiffs had an alternative remedy in the
form of a claim against a government fund set up to compensate those in-
jured.29 The court found “[a] Bivens action is a blunt and powerful instru-
ment for correcting constitutional violations and not an ‘automatic
entitlement’ associated with every governmental infraction.”30
In Mirmehdi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit grappled with the issue
of whether it was proper to infer a Bivens remedy for illegal aliens who
alleged they had been wrongfully denied bond during their deportation pro-
ceedings.31 The court noted the aliens had been able to challenge the propri-
ety of their detention in both their removal proceedings and via petitions for
a writ of habeas corpus.32 The court also noted the aliens’ effort to litigate a
Bivens claim implicated sensitive issues of diplomacy, foreign policy, and
national security.33 In light of the alternative remedies available and the
special factors counseling hesitation, the court declined to infer a Bivens
remedy for the aliens.34
In light of this decisional authority, Department of Justice attorneys
defending federal employees against personal liability constitutional tort
claims will carefully consider at the outset whether it is proper for the dis-
trict court to infer the Bivens remedy. Where the plaintiff has another way
to litigate the propriety of the challenged conduct, defendants usually file a
motion to dismiss, urging the district court to eschew inferring a Bivens
remedy. This type of motion will be especially well-taken if the plaintiff’s
26. 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
27. Id. at 704.
28. 523 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008).
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id. at 125 (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 537 (2007)).
31. 662 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011).
32. Id. at 1080.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009)).
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claim is analogous to the claims at issue in Malesko, Wilkie, Arar, Wilson,
or Benzman. Moreover, although the decisional authority is less clear-cut, it
is also possible to argue the district courts should decline to infer a Bivens
remedy when the plaintiff can seek relief under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Tucker Act, or the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.
B. Whether qualified immunity protects the employee from suit on a
Bivens claim
If the district court infers a Bivens remedy, the defense of choice is
qualified immunity. Although some decisions still refer to “good faith” im-
munity, this is a misnomer. The qualified immunity defense is wholly ob-
jective, and no inquiry into a defendant’s subjective good faith is
appropriate.35 The qualified immunity inquiry remains wholly objective
even when the official’s subjective intent is an essential part of plaintiff’s
affirmative case.36
1. Qualified immunity basics
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discre-
tionary functions from liability insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.37 The doctrine of qualified immunity may, nev-
ertheless, even protect employees who violate the Constitution from suit.38
2. The concept of “clearly established law”
In essence, qualified immunity gives public officials the benefit of the
doubt so long as the law at the time of their conduct did not clearly prohibit
their actions.39 Qualified immunity provides “ample room for mistaken
judgments” and protects all government officials except “the plainly incom-
petent or those who knowingly violate the law.”40 Thus, officials are im-
35. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1985) (observing that Harlow “purged quali-
fied immunity doctrine of its subjective components”); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984)
(observing that Harlow “rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective
standard”).
36. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998) (explaining that qualified immu-
nity “may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise
improperly motivated,” because “evidence concerning the defendant’s subjective intent is simply
irrelevant to that defense”).
37. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987).
38. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 618 (1999) (holding that presence of media
during execution of warrant violated Fourth Amendment but granting qualified immunity because
right was not clearly established).
39. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (describing qualified immu-
nity as “accommodation for reasonable error”).
40. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986).
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mune from claims for damages “as long as their actions could reasonably
have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have
violated.”41
The test, moreover, is whether reasonable officials, not judges or con-
stitutional scholars, could have thought the defendant’s conduct was per-
missible under the Constitution.42 “If the law did not put the officer on
notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based
on qualified immunity is appropriate.”43
When grappling with what is “clearly established,” the most critical
step is properly defining the right at issue. The inquiry must be “fact-spe-
cific”44 and “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,
not as a broad general proposition.”45 To overcome qualified immunity,
“the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly
established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”46
This rule takes into account one of the fundamental purposes of quali-
fied immunity, which is to bar liability when it would be “difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts.”47 The Supreme Court, therefore, has
consistently begun its qualified immunity analysis by defining the claimed
right with relevant specificity.48 Thus, although plaintiffs will often attempt
to bypass the second step of qualified immunity by asserting some hoary
but general constitutional precept, such as “due process,” “free speech,” or
“reasonableness,” courts must look to whether, on the particular facts of the
case, the right was clearly established.
3. What sort of authority makes a right clearly established?
Once the court has defined the specific right at issue, the next step is to
determine whether that right is “clearly established.” It goes too far to say
41. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638.
42. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.
43. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
44. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
45. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
46. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
47. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
48. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curium) (defining “the
situation [the defendant] confronted” as “whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding cap-
ture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area were at risk from that flight”);
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“[T]he appropriate question is the objective inquiry
of whether a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a
home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established law and
the information the officers possessed.”); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291 (1999) (defining
relevant question as whether “use of a search warrant by government actors violates an attorney’s
right to practice his profession”).
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that qualified immunity applies unless the very action in question has previ-
ously been held unlawful. “In the light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness
must be apparent.”49 The “salient question” is whether the officer had “fair
warning” or “fair notice” that her actions would violate the law.50
What constitutes fair warning varies from situation to situation.51
Where the Constitution is specific, its plain text may clearly establish the
right.52 Most often, however, the Constitution’s text is “cast at a high level
of generality” such that its application to particular facts will clearly estab-
lish a governing rule only in “obvious” cases.53 Therefore, review of deci-
sional authority interpreting the constitutional provision at issue is usually
needed.54 The decisions need not be “fundamentally similar” or “materially
similar” to the facts, especially when egregious violations are at issue—
“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in novel factual circumstances.”55
It is not necessary for the Supreme Court to have considered the issue
being litigated. Decisions from the courts of appeal can clearly establish a
constitutional rule.56 When the issue, however, is “one in which the result
depends very much on the facts of each case,” an officer cannot have fair
notice unless the cases “squarely govern[ ].”57 The Supreme Court has iden-
tified at least two situations in which case law is unlikely to have clearly
established a constitutional rule. First, a circuit split on an issue indicates
that the law is not clearly established.58 Second, “when an earlier case ex-
pressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of
conduct at issue,” the law on that conduct is not clearly established unless a
later case addresses the question with “a very high degree of prior factual
particularity.”59
49. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
50. Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 741 (2002).
51. Id. at 740–41.
52. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (holding that no reasonable officer could
believe the warrant that did not particularly describe objects subject to seizure could be valid
given Fourth Amendment’s textual requirement of particularity).
53. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199.
54. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001) (“[N]either respondent nor the Court
of Appeals has identified any case demonstrating a clearly established rule prohibiting the officer
from acting as he did.”) (emphasis added).
55. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
56. Id. at 741–43 (examining Eleventh Circuit precedent).
57. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201; see also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999) (holding
that law was not clearly established where cases all dealt with a complete prohibition of the right
to engage in a certain calling, not the brief interruption which affected plaintiff).
58. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (“If judges thus disagree on a constitu-
tional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the
controversy.”).
59. Hope, 536 U.S. at 740–41 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71
(1997)).
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An official remains immune even if her conduct violated other non-
constitutional standards, such as internal guidelines, ethical principles, or
regulations.60 For example, in Magluta v. Samples, a pretrial detainee
brought a Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim against prison
managers after they housed him in administrative detention and failed to
provide him the periodic review mandated by a Bureau of Prisons regula-
tion.61 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the detainee’s argument that violating
the regulation was the same as violating the Constitution.62 The controlling
decisional authority interpreting the constitutional provision at issue, rather
than the Code of Federal Regulation, the Court of Appeals held, supplied
the standards.63
While agency policy does not by itself control the immunity analysis,
courts sometimes examine it to see if the law is clearly established.64 A
policy proscribing the challenged conduct certainly undermines any argu-
ment the employee was not aware his conduct was unlawful.65 On the other
hand, a policy expressly allowing or requiring certain conduct may support
an officer’s contention that he reasonably believed his conduct was consti-
tutional.66 It is good to note, however, that the agency policy must be read
against the decisional authority.67
4. Qualified immunity is more than a defense to liability
Qualified immunity protects not only against liability but also from
trial and even discovery.68 Litigation diverts official energy and resources
from pressing public problems; the threat of personal liability discourages
capable people from assuming public positions; and the fear of suit may
deter officials from exercising judgment with the decisiveness critical to
their offices.69 Because litigation imposes these costs regardless of liability,
qualified immunity “is immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability.”70 Moreover, because these costs begin to accrue as soon as a case
is filed, the Supreme Court “repeatedly ha[s] stressed the importance of
60. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194–96 n.12 (1984).
61. 375 F.3d 1269, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2004).
62. Id. at 1279 n.7.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004).
65. See id.
66. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
67. See Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002) (opining that regulation appeared to be
sham in light of mandates in case law); Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617–18 (holding that officers could
rely on policy only where case law “was at best undeveloped”).
68. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (explaining that qualified immunity protects
officials from “expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits” and
from “not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those
defending a long drawn out lawsuit”).
69. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
70. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
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resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”71 If
a defendant raises qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss or a predis-
covery motion for summary judgment, the court should not allow discovery
“until this threshold immunity question is resolved.”72
5. The analytical framework for qualified immunity
As noted above, the qualified immunity test contains two steps. For
many years, the Supreme Court mandated that the “initial inquiry” must be
whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.73 If the of-
ficer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right, then “there is no neces-
sity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”74 “[I]f a violation
could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions,” how-
ever, then “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established.”75
During the 1990s, the Supreme Court warned against skipping ahead
to the second step and insisted lower courts begin with the initial inquiry
into whether the challenged conduct was constitutional.76 The Court ex-
plained that addressing the steps in order advanced “the law’s elaboration
from case to case” by ensuring courts will “set forth principles which will
become the basis for a holding that the right is clearly established.”77 Other-
wise, the Court reasoned, “standards of official conduct would tend to re-
main uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals.”78 In
following years, however, enthusiasm on the Court for grappling with often
difficult constitutional questions at the outset of every case where qualified
immunity was in play seemed to wane. In fact, in some cases, the Court
failed to follow its own instruction.79
71. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (“Where
the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the pro-
ceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.”).
72. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)
(“[I]f the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should resolve that thresh-
old question before permitting discovery.”).
73. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (criticizing court of appeals for assuming
without deciding the “preliminary issue” of whether the plaintiff had alleged a constitutional vio-
lation); see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998).
77. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
78. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 n.5.
79. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (expressing “no
view” on the constitutional question itself and instead concluding that “however that question is
decided, the Court of Appeals was wrong on the issue of qualified immunity”); Saucier, 533 U.S.
at 207–08 (assuming violation could have occurred on facts alleged and proceeding directly to
assessment of clearly established law).
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By 2008, at least four sitting justices had signaled support for a more
flexible approach.80 Criticism of what Justice Breyer called a “rigid order of
battle” was building in the courts of appeal as well.81 In March of 2008, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearson v. Callahan with specific in-
structions that clearly signaled its intention to revisit the analytical frame-
work.82 In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the Court
directed the parties to brief and argue whether Saucier v. Katz should be
overruled.
On January 23, 2009, Pearson held that it should.83 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Alito began the analysis by recognizing the two-
step test mandated by Siegert and Saucier “is often beneficial” to help de-
velop constitutional law.84 He noted, however, that requiring a threshold
determination regarding the constitutionality of the challenged conduct
comes at a price. It sometimes requires “substantial expenditure of scarce
judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome
of the case.”85 Constitutional tort defendants are also adversely affected
80. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lways
requiring lower courts first to answer constitutional questions is misguided . . . . I would end the
failed Saucier experiment now.”); Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 617 (2007) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Ginsburg and urging disavowal of “the unwise practice of
deciding constitutional questions in advance of the necessity for doing so”); Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 387–89 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should overrule require-
ment announced in Saucier); id. at 386–87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing Court should
confront Saucier but in a factually different case); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201–02 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg and criticizing “current rule” as “rigidly re-
quir[ing] courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions”); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 859
(Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that courts should have discretion to consider whether a particu-
lar right is clearly established first, before determining whether it exists at all).
81. See, e.g., Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We find in this case an
exception to [Saucier’s] generally mandated analytic framework.”); id. at 112 n.13 (Smith, J.,
concurring) (identifying cases where other circuits expressed doubts about or declined to follow
Saucier); Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (While “we are
bound to follow [Saucier’s rule] until further notice . . . [w]e are free to muse . . . that [it] may lead
to the publication of a lot of bad constitutional law that is, effectively, cert-proof.”); Robinette v.
Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 592, 593 n.8 (8th Cir. 2007) (assuming without deciding that a constitutional
violation occurred and declaring that posited objective of Saucier “would be ill served by a ruling
here” on the constitutional question); Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48, 57–58 (2d
Cir. 2003) (listing circumstances under which strict adherence to Saucier would not be appropri-
ate); Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting prescribed order where
analysis of whether right exists would have required federal courts to construe Puerto Rico law);
Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Whether the first prong of a qualified
immunity defense . . . is a mandatory step or merely a recommendation remains, to some extent, a
bit of an open question.”). But see, e.g., Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 208 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Despite continued criticism” of Saucier, “unless and until the Supreme Court heeds the plea to
overrule [it], we will continue to ask first whether a constitutional violation has occurred and only
then ask whether defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.”).
82. 552 U.S. 1279 (2008).
83. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 236–37.
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when they are required to litigate a constitutional question in an area where
the law is obviously not clearly established.86
Justice Alito also reasoned that mandating the first step in the qualified
immunity analysis did little to develop the jurisprudence.87 Some issues
were so fact-bound that a decision provided little guidance in future cases.88
Others required lower courts to decide an issue pending in a higher court
with the possibility for conflicting holdings.89 Moreover, in those cases
where qualified immunity is decided in a ruling on a motion to dismiss,
resolving the constitutional issue is difficult in the absence of a fully devel-
oped factual record.90 This sometimes leads to “woefully inadequate” advo-
cacy by the parties and the risk that a court “may not devote as much care
as it would in other circumstances to the decision of the constitutional
issue.”91
Pearson also notes that mandating both steps of the qualified immu-
nity analysis sometimes creates problems in the circuit court for defendants
who prevailed in the district court. “Where a court holds that a defendant
committed a constitutional violation but that the violation was not clearly
established, the defendant may face a difficult situation. As the winning
party, the defendant’s right to appeal the adverse holding on the constitu-
tional question may be contested.”92 Finally, adherence to Saucier’s two
step protocol departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance and
runs counter to the general rule against passing on questions of constitution-
ality unless such adjudication is unavoidable.93
Summing up its decision to abandon the mandatory two-step test for
qualified immunity, Pearson held:
On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude
that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it
should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the
district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.94
Pearson should be a positive development for federal employees fac-
ing personal liability constitutional tort Bivens claims. Nothing in the deci-
sion prevents the traditional “belt and suspenders” argument that the
challenged conduct did not violate the Constitution, and, even if it did, the
86. Id. at 237.
87. Id. at 238.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 237–40.
91. Id. at 239.
92. Id. at 240.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 236.
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law was not clearly established. In cases presenting a close question, how-
ever, Department of Justice attorneys will be able to bypass Saucier’s
thicket and urge entitlement to qualified immunity on the ground that the
law is not clearly established.
6. Qualified immunity and the elusive “extraordinary
circumstances”
In Harlow, the Supreme Court suggested that even if the challenged
conduct violated a constitutional right and that right was clearly established,
qualified immunity might still bar suit. In this situation, qualified immunity
only bars the suit “if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known
of the relevant legal standard.”95 The Supreme Court has never explained
precisely what circumstances are “extraordinary” enough to warrant quali-
fied immunity, and the courts of appeal have not often grappled with this
question. Nevertheless, the decisions teach that some circumstances might
be extraordinary enough to warrant qualified immunity.
Several circuits agree, for instance, that an officer acting on the advice
of counsel may be able to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances pre-
vented him from recognizing clearly established law.96 Other decisions
seem to go the other way, holding that reliance on advice of counsel “is not
inherently extraordinary, for few things in government are more common
than the receipt of legal advice.”97 Whether advice of counsel is an ex-
traordinary circumstance sometimes turns on:
[1] how unequivocal, and specifically tailored to the particular
facts giving rise to the controversy, the advice was, [2] whether
complete information had been provided to the advising attor-
ney(s), [3] the prominence and competence of the attorney(s), and
[4] how soon after the advice was received the disputed action
was taken.98
Aside from advice of counsel, there is little consensus on what circum-
stances might rise to the level of “extraordinary.” Some courts have sug-
gested that circumstances might be extraordinary when an officer relies on a
state or local statute.99 Other decisions consider reliance on the advice of
95. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
96. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2005); Davis v.
Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 620–21 (7th Cir. 1998); Buonocore v. Harris, 134 F.3d 245, 252–53
(4th Cir. 1998); cf. Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
potential for advice of counsel to create extraordinary circumstances but noting Sixth Circuit has
never granted qualified immunity on that ground).
97. V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990).
98. Id. at 1489 (internal citations omitted); accord Davis, 149 F.3d at 620.
99. See Roska ex rel. Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964, 971 (10th Cir. 2006); Mimics, Inc. v.
Vill. of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 846 (10th Cir. 2005).
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superior officers;100 acts directly at the behest of a judge;101 budgetary con-
straints precluding a certain course of action;102 or an emergency precluding
further factual investigation.103
7. Qualified immunity and the burden of pleading and persuasion
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that the individual defen-
dant must plead.104 The Supreme Court, however, has never explained what
each party must prove once the defense has been asserted.105 Of course to
the extent qualified immunity is properly raised and the facts are undis-
puted, the defense presents a question of law to which notions of burden
allocation are, in a sense, irrelevant.106 In the absence of instructions, the
courts of appeal have developed widely divergent (and sometimes elabo-
rate) approaches to allocating the burden of demonstrating various aspects
of the qualified immunity inquiry.107
IV. DEFENDING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AGAINST PERSONAL LIABILITY
TORT CLAIMS PREMISED UPON AN ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
Occasionally Department of Justice lawyers will encounter a claim that
seeks to recover money damages from an employee’s personal assets pre-
mised upon an allegation the employee violated a federal statute.
The first inquiry is whether the statute in question provides a private
right of action, and there is a four-part test: (1) whether the statute was
enacted for the benefit of the plaintiff; (2) indication of legislative intent to
create a private remedy; (3) consistency with the purposes of the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action would traditionally come under
state law.108 The central question is whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.109
100. See, e.g., Liu v. Phillips, 234 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2000).
101. See Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1991).
103. Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1987).
104. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 586 (1998); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815 (1982); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
105. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 642 (noting that Justice Rehnquist joined the Court’s opinion
based on his understanding that the opinion “le[ft] open the issue of the burden of persuasion, as
opposed to the burden of pleading”).
106. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515–16 (1994).
107. Constraints of space preclude a circuit-by-circuit analysis of this topic here, but the rules
are easily researchable.
108. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
109. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); see also Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002) (focusing on congressional intent as evidenced by statutory text);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (same); cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 179–80 (1988) (focusing on congressional intent but looking more broadly to legislative
history and allowing that private rights of action could be implied rather than explicit).
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Generally speaking, courts are reluctant to find that a federal statute
provides a private right of action against an individual employee.110 There
are, however, some statutes that create a private right of action, which may
be asserted against a federal employee in his individual capacity.111 If no
private right of action exists for the statute upon which the plaintiff relies, it
should be a simple matter to seek dismissal of the personal liability federal
statutory claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
If, however, the statute in question is one where the courts have found
a private right of action, the defense of choice is qualified immunity. The
Supreme Court has long recognized qualified immunity is available to
counter not only constitutional claims but also statutory claims.112 The
courts of appeal are in accord.113
V. DEFENDING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AGAINST PERSONAL LIABILITY
TORT CLAIMS PREMISED UPON AN ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF STATE LAW
The general rule is that federal employees enjoy absolute immunity
from personal liability in state law tort claims challenging negligent or
wrongful acts undertaken while acting within the scope of their government
employment.114 The source of this absolute immunity is the Federal Em-
ployees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly
known as the Westfall Act, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
110. See, e.g., Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (“relief
under Title VII is available only against an employer, not an individual supervisor or fellow
employee”); Wheeler v. Gilmore, 998 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Privacy Act allows a
private cause of action against a federal agency, not individuals); Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416,
1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (the only proper defendant in a federal employee’s suit under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act is the agency head); Garcia v. SUNY Health Scis. Ctr. of Brook-
lyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (Title II of the ADA does not provide for suit against a public
official acting in his individual capacity); Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding that no claim may be asserted against individual federal officials for violation of
the Freedom of Information Act).
111. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (permitting suit against individual for alleged violation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act); Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1987) (permitting suit against individual
for alleged violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act); Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co.,
128 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2008) (permitting suit against individual for alleged violation of RICO
Act).
112. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”) (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that qualified
immunity may be raised as a defense to a plaintiff’s statutory claims under the Federal Wiretap
Act); Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1214–15 n.9 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding qualified immunity
is available against statutory claim unless Congress intended to abrogate the defense of qualified
immunity to claims under that act).
114. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229–30 (2007).
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Under the Westfall Act, the exclusive remedy for anyone injured by
the negligent or wrongful act of a federal employee is a suit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).115 Despite this
clear statutory command, Department of Justice attorneys often encounter
plaintiffs who seek to recover money damages from the personal assets of
federal employees for alleged violations of state tort law. Fortunately, this
common pleading mistake is easily remedied. The Westfall Act permits the
Attorney General to certify that the employee “was acting within the scope
of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the
claim arose.”116 If the case is pending in state court, this certification per-
mits the case to be removed to federal court any time prior to trial.117 The
certification also causes the employee to be dismissed from the action and
the United States to be substituted in his place as the only defendant in the
state law tort claim.118 From that point, the case proceeds like any other
claim under the FTCA, and all the usual FTCA defenses apply.119
Of course, the FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and it
expressly excludes certain claims.120 Moreover, compliance with the
FTCA’s statute of limitations is a jurisdictional prerequisite.121 Accord-
ingly, in some cases, following the substitution of the United States as the
sole party defendant under the Westfall Act, it is clear the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief. Some plaintiffs respond by arguing that the substitution
was improper, apparently preferring to sue the employee individually in-
stead of pursuing a claim against the United States, which is doomed to fail.
Usually, this argument is couched in terms of a challenge to the certification
of scope of employment.
The Supreme Court held in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno that the
Attorney General’s certifications under the Act are judicially reviewable.122
Guiterrez did not flesh out the kind of review allowed, but the lower courts
have agreed that de novo review is appropriate.123 Although certification
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).
118. Id.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(4).
120. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006) (claims challenging discretionary decisions); 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) (intentional torts).
121. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b) (2006).
122. See Gutierrez v. Puccini, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995).
123. See, e.g., Rogers v. Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 123 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1997); McHugh v. Univ.
of Vt., 966 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1992); Schrob v. Patterson, 967 F.2d 929, 936 n.13 (3d Cir. 1992);
Maron v. United States, 126 F.3d 317, 322 (4th Cir. 1997); Palmer v. United States, 93 F.3d 196,
198–99 (5th Cir. 1996); Singleton v. United States, 277 F.3d 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2002); Sullivan v.
United States, 21 F.3d 198, 201 n.6 (7th Cir. 1994); Lawson v. United States, 103 F.3d 59, 60 (8th
Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 1077 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996); Richman v. Straley, 48 F.3d
1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 1995); Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301, 304 n.5 (11th Cir. 1992); Haddon v.
United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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review is de novo, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.124 As in civil
cases generally, the burden of persuasion is a preponderance of the evi-
dence.125 Unless challenged, a certification is conclusive evidence that the
employee was acting in the scope of employment, and trial courts may not
insist on affidavits or evidentiary support for it.126 Once the plaintiff chal-
lenges the certification, however, it has no evidentiary weight, and the dis-
trict court’s decision is reviewed de novo.
In summary, personal liability tort claims against federal employees
seeking money damages from their personal assets may be asserted under
multiple theories implicating multiple areas of constitutional, statutory, and
decisional authority. At the same time, federal employees have a wide vari-
ety of defense strategies at their disposal. In some cases, a claim may ini-
tially be brought against an individual employee but eventually be litigated
against the United States, which brings sovereign immunity into play. In
others, a defendant’s assertion of entitlement to qualified immunity may
result in one or more immediate appeals as of right from interlocutory or-
ders entered by the district court.127 Accordingly, many civil actions assert-
ing these claims become extremely complex procedurally.128 A skillful
practitioner will never forget the Bivenista maxim semper rogatio adiecta
(there is always another motion).
124. See, e.g., Day v. Mass. Air National Guard, 167 F.3d 678, 685 (1st Cir. 1999); Melo v.
Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 747 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 827
(4th Cir. 2000); Palmer v. Newton, 93 F.3d 196, 198–99 (5th Cir. 1996); Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149
F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1998); Larson v. Frederiksen, 277 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002); Bill-
ings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995); Richman v. Straley, 48 F.3d 1139, 1145
(10th Cir. 1995); Flohr v. Mackojak, 84 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996); Kimbro v. Velten, 30
F.3d 1501, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
125. See, e.g., Borneman, 213 F.3d at 827; Billings, 57 F.3d at 800; Raisig v. United States, 34
F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Barry v. Stevenson, 965 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (E.D.
Wis. 1997).
126. See Rogers v. Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 123 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1997).
127. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that a district court’s
denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is appealable
under the collateral order doctrine, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment).
128. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, No. 91-5312, 1992 WL 394503 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1992)
(remanding Bivens case challenging warrantless wiretaps undertaken during the Nixon administra-
tion to district court for further proceedings after nineteen years of litigation); Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (describing Bivens case as having a procedural history “portending
another Jarndyce v. Jarndyce”); Magluta v. Samples, 238 Fed. App’x 458 (11th Cir. 2007)
(resolving Bivens case in defendants’ favor after thirteen years of litigation and four decisions by
the Court of Appeals).
